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 Abstract 
Several new smartphones are released every year. Many people upgrade to new phones, 
and their old phones are not put to any further use. In this paper, we explore the feasibility of 
using such retired smartphones and their on-board sensors to build a home security system. We 
observe that door-related events such as opening and closing have unique vibration signatures 
when compared to many types of environmental vibrational noise. These events can be captured 
by the accelerometer of a smartphone when the phone is mounted on a wall near a door. The 
rotation of a door can also be captured by the magnetometer of a smartphone when the phone is 
mounted on a door. We design machine learning and threshold-based methods to detect door 
opening events based on accelerometer and magnetometer data and build a prototype home 
security system that can detect door openings and notify the homeowner via email, SMS and 
phone calls upon break-in detection. To further augment our security system, we explore using 
the smartphone’s built-in microphone to detect door and window openings across multiple doors 
and windows simultaneously. Experiments in a residential home show that the accelerometer-
based detection can detect door open events with an accuracy higher than 98%, and 
magnetometer-based detection has 100% accuracy. By using the magnetometer method to 
automate the training phase of a neural network, we find that sound-based detection of door 
openings has an accuracy of 90% across multiple doors. 
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 1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
A. Overview 
Mobile hardware is evolving at an extremely fast pace. Most big smartphone vendors 
produce a new smartphone every year, causing many users to upgrade to a new device every year 
or two. In particular, iPhone sales have nearly tripled in the last five years [1]. Most of these 
retired devices still function as expected save for some scratches or cracks, but are ignored until 
either recycled, sold at a fraction of the initial cost, or thrown away. This leads to the all-too-
common “smartphone graveyard”- a place where old phones collect dust indefinitely. These 
retired smartphones are almost always equipped with highly sensitive motion capture chips. 
Though less frequently mentioned, these devices are also equipped with triple-axis 
magnetometers which are used for analyzing the device’s orientation with respect to Earth’s 
Magnetic North Pole. And, of course, these phones are all equipped with microphones. 
Personal, small-scale home security systems are becoming increasingly popular. Most 
professional systems, however, cannot be installed by the end-user and come with a large upfront 
cost as well as recurring costs such as annual fees. ADT, a professional home security company, 
charges upwards of $600 annually for their most popular home security package in addition to 
installation fees which can run as high as $1,600 [2]. Though a smartphone-based home security 
system would not be a smart investment to purchase all at once, the retired phones mentioned 
earlier can be used as a home security system without purchasing any new hardware. Since most 
users are already familiar with the hardware and software of smartphone, it would be easy for 
them to set up and use a smartphone-based home security system in their homes. While several 
smartphone-based home security solutions exist, most of them use the device’s camera to 
monitor events within the camera’s field of view. These solutions have considerable drawbacks 
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such as poor lowlight performance, using large amounts (several gigabytes) of storage, and the 
inability to detect break-in related events out of its field of view. Different from existing work, 
we study the feasibility of building a home security system based on smartphone accelerometers, 
magnetometers and microphones. Specifically, we will detect door and window opening events 
using the device’s accelerometer, magnetometer, and microphone [23].  
When a door is opened or closed, some of the kinetic energy transfers into the walls 
surrounding the door. The iPhone 4’s accelerometer, with a maximum sensitivity of 1 mg/digit 
[3], has been proved to be capable of detecting keystrokes on a keyboard with an accuracy as 
high as 80% [4][24][25]. With this level of sensitivity, the six-year-old iPhone 4 is more than 
sensitive enough to detect vibrations in a wall caused by door activity. Newer phone models 
usually have as good or better sensitivity. Figure 1 shows our observation of vibrations caused by 
a door opening captured by accelerometer. This initial data was obtained by simply opening a 
door while an iPhone 6 mounted to the wall nine inches from the door recorded vibrations. It can 
be seen that door events emit distinguishable vibrational patterns. Most noticeably, when the 
device is mounted near a door in portrait orientation, door-related vibrations captured by the on-
board accelerometer are especially large along the z-axis. Figure 2 shows a graphical 
representation of how the three motion axes are related to the orientation of the device. In 
addition to the accelerometer, the magnetometer can also be used to monitor the rotation of a 
door and detect door openings. By mounting a smartphone on a door (e.g., near the hinge) and 
monitoring the change in magnetic fields passing through the device, door events can be easily 
detected. We reference Earth’s Magnetic North to determine how far the door has rotated - 
essentially using the smartphone as a compass needle while the door is the compass body. This 
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method is less likely to produce false detection of door openings under environmental noise, 
although it cannot detect other events such as window openings when mounted on the door. 
 
 
Though the accelerometer and magnetometer are very capable of detecting door open 
events, their effectiveness is closely tied to the phone’s proximity to the door. With this in mind, 
we explore the possibility of using the phone’s built-in microphone to detect the sounds of door 
openings. This approach allows us to place the phone in a more centralized location and monitor 
more than one door at a time. We use a neural network that specializes in categorizing images to 
classify spectrograms generated by the device. Figure 3 shows an example of one such 
spectrogram. Because each door has a relatively unique and distinct audio signature, we found it 
necessary to train the model on each door. 
In this thesis, we explore several methods to use a smartphone’s embedded 
accelerometer, magnetometer, and microphone to reliably detect door and window openings and 
propose a home security system (named SecureHouse) for break-in detection and notification 
Fig. 1: Raw Vibration Data for Door Open Event Fig. 2: Device Motion Axes 
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[23]. Upon event detection, the detecting smartphone can send a customizable notification to the 
homeowner via short message, email, and/or telephone call. 
B. Contributions 
 The contribution of this thesis is summarized as follows: 
1. We propose SecureHouse, a home security system based on smartphone sensors. To the 
best of our knowledge, this is the first study that detects door openings for home security 
purposes using the on-board accelerometer, magnetometer, and microphone of a 
smartphone. 
2. We propose two machine learning methods to detect door openings using accelerometer 
data and one threshold-based method to detect door openings using magnetometer data. 
We also propose a machine learning method to detect door openings using sound. 
3. We implement a prototype home security system. The system contains a mobile app 
which runs on a wall-mounted phone that can efficiently interpret sensor data and 
asynchronously dispatch notifications using its Wi-Fi connection, a 3D printed modular 
smartphone case specifically designed to capture vibrations in a wall, and a threat 
response server that sends out alerts to the homeowner in the form of text messages, 
emails, and phone calls. 
4. We evaluate the system’s effectiveness to detect door events using extensive 
experiments. 
C. Organization of This Thesis 
 The remainder of this thesis is as follows. Chapter II presents related work. Chapter III 
presents the design of our system including system architecture and detection methods.  Chapter 
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IV describes our prototype implementation. Chapter V describes our experimental methodology 
and evaluation results. Chapter VI concludes the paper. 
 
 
 
 
 Fig. 3: Spectrogram Generated on Smartphone. Amplitude is 
represented by color and ranges from red to violet. To make 
the figure easier to read, we have replaced the red hues with 
white. 
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II.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Wu et al. [5] propose a scheme to detect door events using the built-in barometer found in 
some modern smartphones. The key principle behind their work is that modern heating, 
ventilation and air condition (HVAC) systems maintain a constant pressure difference between 
inside and outside. Thus, when a door is opened, a sudden and recognizable change in barometric 
pressure occurs. We conducted experiments of our own using their methods and saw very similar 
results in a three-bedroom house. Specifically, we measured the fluctuation in pressure inside a 
home when a door is opened and closed. Figure 4 shows a clear change in pressure caused by 
door movement compared to background noise shown in Figure 5. However, the system can be 
rendered ineffective if the home has an open window since the air pressure inside and outside a 
home will be the same in that case. Figure 6 shows barometer readings from a door event when 
two windows are open. We no longer see the distinguishable curve similar to Figure 4, and the 
barometer readings become close to background noise shown in Figure 5. This is especially 
relevant where a homeowner might leave a window open while she is away (e.g., a window has 
metal bars on it and thus the homeowner considers it safe to leave the window open).  
 
    
 
Fig. 4: Air Pressure Fluctuations for Door 
Event with Windows Closed 
Fig. 5: Air Pressure Fluctuations without 
Any Door Events (noise) 
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Behringer et al. [6] have designed and implemented an automobile alert system using the 
accelerometer and GPS chips of smartphones. The system is capable of interpreting multiple 
types of car-related events such as engine ignition, door closing, and car motion. However, the 
system is designed for automobiles, not for home security.  
Toyoda et al. [7] explore using neural networks to classify environmental sounds. Though 
this work is similar to a portion of our own, the team does not implement a security system based 
on the classification of sounds. Additionally, Toyoda’s work does not limit itself to the 
processing power of a mobile device. Because of the extent of the limitations of using a 
smartphone to train and evaluate the neural network, we believe our work in that particular area 
is distinct enough to justify our work. 
As to commercial products whose aim is to transform old smartphones into a security 
system, there are several published apps such as Presence, Manything, and Alfred [8][9][10]. 
These apps are among the most popular applications that use smartphones as a video-based home 
security system. These systems use simplistic video analyzation to detect motion within the 
camera’s field of view under adequate lighting conditions. While they are effective for detecting 
Fig. 6: Air Pressure Fluctuations for Door 
Event with Windows Open 
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general motion inside the home, their fundamental limitation is that a camera cannot detect 
motions out of its field of view and it requires good lighting conditions which likely are not 
available at night. Also, these systems can generate a large amount of data (more than 200GB 
[11] encoded as H.264 [12] at 1080p) each day which needs to be stored somewhere. Storing this 
data on the device itself is not practical because most mobile devices have between 16GB and 
256GB of local storage. Naturally, these systems propose a solution by storing video on the 
cloud. In particular, Manything charges a Cloud Recording fee of $5.99 per month to be able to 
view past recorded events. This additional expense combined with the limited field of view and 
lighting requirements of a camera show that new technologies are needed. 
  9 
III.  SYSTEM DESIGN 
 
A. System Overview 
As shown in Figure 7, our system has three components: a wall-mounted smartphone, a 
response server, and the homeowner’s smartphone. The wall-mounted smartphone detects door 
opening events and dispatches a notification request to the response server. The response server 
sends out notifications to the homeowner via email, text message, and/or phone calls. Finally, the 
homeowner’s smartphone receives the notifications and alerts the homeowner.  
 
 
 
 
There are a total of six major software modules in our detection system; four in the wall-
mounted device (included in one app) and two in the cloud-based threat response server. The 
homeowner’s smartphone does not require any other apps to be installed since the notifications 
Fig.7: SecureHouse System Architecture 
 10 
arrive as text messages, phone calls, or emails which are already supported in nearly every 
smartphone. 
For door opening detection, vibrational or magnetic field data is captured by the raw 
motion manager. This module is responsible for reading and interpreting raw acceleration and 
magnetic field data and audio samples. Thirty times per second, the manager pre-processes the 
motion sensor data and sends it to the threat detection module. This module implements a sliding 
window or acts as a data passer depending on the detection algorithm. For accelerometer-based 
detection via neural network and k-nearest neighbors (see Chapter III-B), the threat detection 
module asks the A.I. module for an interpretation based on the last 30 samples (1s) of data. For 
magnetometer-based detection (see Chapter III-C), the detection module simply performs the 
basic calculations and checks against a threshold to detect a door opening. Upon detection, the 
detection module notifies the threat response module, which decides the appropriate action to 
take based on certain conditions of the device such as whether the alarm function is turned on, 
internet connectivity, and user preference. When the alarm function is turned on and under 
normal circumstances, the threat response module will send an HTTP request to the Threat 
Response Server. The HTTP request will indicate what type of event happened and the 
homeowner’s preferred ways of notifications such as email, SMS, phone call, or a combination 
of them. In the case of Wi-Fi connectivity issues, the threat response module will play a loud 
alarm sound in an attempt to deter intruders. Under normal circumstances, the alert system will 
not play an alarm since this may panic the intruder- which could cause the intruder to become 
reckless, cause damage, and/or escape. The homeowner can disable the alarm when she is at 
home awake. She can turn on the alarm function before she goes to sleep or when she leaves 
home.  
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Our Threat Response Server is designed to run on any server capable of running Node.js 
programs. There are many such services available including free services. Our prototype system 
(see Chapter IV) is hosted by Heroku [13], a free third-party cloud application hosting platform. 
Several other free Node.js hosting solutions are available, such as IBM Bluemix [14], OpenShift 
[15], and Amazon Web Services (AWS). Incoming network requests (generated by the wall-
mounted smartphone) are handled by the server’s network request module. This module is 
simply responsible for handling and parsing incoming HTTP requests. After a network request 
has been processed, this module sends a message to the server’s notification module, which will 
send out the alert according to the HTTP request. Though it is technically possible to use a home 
computer to perform this function, using an external server has a few important advantages. 
First, a user may want to change their notification preferences or silence the alarm while away 
from home. This can be easily done with an external server. However, for this to happen with a 
server at home, the homeowner would need to set up port forwarding on their router at home. 
This process is usually a little too technical for the average homeowner, and would be a 
detriment to the ease of installation of our system. Additionally, if any data related to a break-in 
is stored on the Threat Response Server, a burglar could potentially steal the server from the 
home and destroy some key pieces of evidence. 
B. Accelerometer-Based Detection 
1. A Naive Detection Algorithm 
Before going to our proposed learning-based algorithms, we describe a naive detection 
algorithm. Being very simplistic in nature, the algorithm raises the alarm if and only if the 
vibration intensity (Vi) of each vibrational axis falls between a specific range α and β: 
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αx < Vi(x) < βx 
αy < Vi(y) < βy 
αz < Vi(z) < βz 
 
This method does not use any sort of data queue or sliding window. It just checks every 
incoming value independently at 30Hz. The lower threshold α helps ensure that only 
significantly strong vibrations are considered - thus filtering out ambient and static noise. The 
upper threshold β helps filter stronger types of environmental noise such as the homeowner’s 
footfall. In particular, since footfall and other vibrational noise affects all axes nearly equally 
while door openings affect primarily the z-axis, the upper thresholds βx and βy are substantially 
smaller in magnitude than βz to filter such noise. This approach has several drawbacks. Since the 
thresholds are door-dependent and obtaining them takes several minutes of fine-tuning, it is 
nontrivial and annoying for the homeowner to find an effective set of lower and upper thresholds 
for each door upon installation. Moreover, it performs significantly worse than more advanced 
algorithms as to be shown later. 
2. K-Nearest Neighbors + Dynamic Time Warping 
K-nearest neighbors is a simple machine learning algorithm that classifies an unknown 
data point based on the classification of a certain number of “nearby” data points. For example, 
in 2-dimensional space, the distance between an unclassified point p and all other classified 
points is calculated. Then, we look at k points that are nearest to p and perform a majority vote. 
For our purposes, however, we are using a series of 90 points (thus, 90-dimensional space). 
These 90 data points represent any one-second window of vibrational data along three axes 
captured at 30Hz. To help keep our datasets consistent and to allow our models to be trained 
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more effectively (especially for the neural network in III-B.3), our raw accelerometer data points 
are converted to a positive value (Vi) and then normalized from -1 to 1 (through dividing the 
value by the maximum recorded value, multiplying it by 2, and then subtracting 1). Lastly, we 
decouple the different axes from time such that the new curve takes the form of:  
Vs = < x1…x30, y1…y30, z1…z30> 
We call this new curve a vibrational signature. Figure 8 is an example of a common 
vibrational signature for a door open event. We can see from this figure that the z-axis (the last 
30 samples) is most heavily affected by door open events, with almost no vibration detected in 
the y-axis (middle 30 samples). Since Euclidean and Manhattan distance do not work well for 
such high-dimensional datasets, we use dynamic time warping to measure how similar two 
vibration signatures are. Dynamic time warping is a common algorithm which excels in 
comparing the similarity between two time-series datasets. Specifically, it excels in determining 
similarities which span over different lengths of time. For us, this is especially useful for 
detecting different speeds of door openings. We set k equal to the square root of number of 
training samples. This choice has been shown by the literature to be effective and offers a more 
simplistic implementation than bootstrapping or cross validation. Since the training data needs to 
be generated by a human, the number of training curves is limited to 15-30 door events and 15 
noise events (e.g., footfall inside the home and cars driving by). Due to the high dimensionality 
of the input, the number of training curves used, and the limited processing power of the phone, 
it is not possible to poll this algorithm at 30Hz. This problem is solved by waiting for significant 
vibrational disturbances using an activation threshold. In our experiments, we found that it is 
effective to set the threshold at 0.005 m/s2. Disturbances greater than this threshold value trigger 
the analysis of a 1- second sliding window. The sliding window is essentially a queue that 
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contains only the most recent 90 samples (one second at 30Hz for three axes) of accelerometer 
data. 
 
 
3. Feedforward Neural Network 
In machine learning, artificial neural networks (ANNs) are known for the similarities they draw 
from biological brains. Instead of using neurons, an ANN uses sets of interconnected nodes. 
These nodes are separated into three main categories: input, hidden, and output. ANNs are 
generally known for their ability to generate nonlinear models based on high-dimensionality 
input data. Specifically, we use a feedforward neural network (FFNN). This means that data 
passes through the sets of nodes going in one direction only and there are no cycles allowed in 
the node graph. Figure 9 shows a graphical representation of what a generic feedforward neural 
network looks like at a high level. We choose to use an FFNN since its training phase happens 
all at once in the beginning of the program execution and because generating output from the 
model is very time-efficient. This benefit allows us to poll the FFNN at 30Hz on a resource 
limited smartphone. 
Fig. 8: Vibration Signature for Door Open Event 
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For each door, a neural network is trained using 90-dimensional input data - exactly one 
second of 3-dimensional vibration data being captured at 30Hz. Due to the input requirements 
when training and evaluating the neural network, we use a vibration signature as defined above 
for our inputs instead of raw vibration data. We find that when using 90-dimensional data, using 
60 hidden nodes (90 ∗ 2/3) as suggested by Hundley [16] works well. We use one output node 
which simply returns a float value between 0 and 1. Values closer to 0 correspond to a lower 
chance of the interpreted data being a door event, while values closer to 1 correspond to a higher 
chance of a door event. Throughout this paper, we refer to this interpretation of the output value 
as the assurance of a door opening event. For example, if the assurance of the FFNN is set to 
60%, we classify any output greater than or equal to 0.6 to be a door open event. Due to the 
prediction efficiency of this algorithm, we were able to use the same sliding window approach 
mentioned above to analyze a new vibrational signature every 0.03 seconds (30Hz). 
C. Magnetometer-Based Detection 
Figure 10 shows raw magnetometer data for a door open and close event. We see large, 
easily recognizable curves during the time the door is opening and closing. Very little jitter is 
seen in the magnetometer’s readout, and practically no amount of vibrational interference would 
Fig.9: Representation of FFNN Nodes 
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cause the readout to be significantly distorted. Though it may be possible for an attacker to use a 
strong magnet to interfere with the magnetometer, this would still alert the user because we do 
not use an upper threshold for event detection. Next, we look at a realistic threshold to trigger the 
detection. Since the data for a door event is easy to recognize, we simply use a threshold value to 
detect door events. We found that a difference of 2µT between the current value and the value 
when the door is closed worked well as a threshold to detect door events. Because Earth’s 
magnetic field may differ from location to location, this approach will need to be 
calibrated/zeroed when installed in different locations. Different from the naive vibration-
threshold method mentioned above, the homeowner does not need to fine-tune this system. He 
can simply hit an on-screen button while the door is closed to “zero” the magnetometer. 
 
 
D. Audio-Based Detection 
In this section, we will present our audio-based detection method. For this, we created two 
implementations. The first implementation used raw audio samples, was very naïve and overall 
much less effective. Our second approach involved generating a spectrogram and using that for 
Fig.10: Magnetic Field Measurements of Door Event 
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classification in a neural network. This approach worked significantly better, and we focus on 
this approach for our evaluation. 
1. Using Raw Samples 
A naïve approach to classifying sound is to feed the raw audio waveform directly into a 
neural network. Figure 11 shows an example of what raw audio samples look like when a door is 
opened. Though we can clearly see when the door is opened, there is a lot of jitter and oscillation 
in the signal. The main issue with this approach was that the lowest acceptable sample rate was 
around 8 KHz. This means when we analyze one second of audio, we have 8,000 samples to 
format and classify. Given the limited processing power of the smartphone and the relative 
inefficiency of Hundley’s neural network library, this approach turned out to be too much for the 
phone’s processor to handle. Nonetheless, we continued to lower the sample rate until the 
smartphone was able to process the signal in real-time. At 2 KHz, the phone was finally able to 
keep up with the influx of data, but the audio quality was so poor that the detection accuracy was 
reduced to less than 20%. 
 
 
Fig.11: Raw Audio Samples of Door Open Event 
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2. Using a Spectrogram 
In this approach, we convert the raw audio samples into a spectrogram using Apple’s UIKit 
framework. Generally, spectrograms are used to represent the amplitudes of many frequencies 
over time [26][27][28]. Using a spectrogram, we can see a clear, distinguishable, and unique 
signal when the door is opened. To further increase the chance of success in this approach, we 
decided to abandon Hundley’s neural network library in favor of Apple’s recently released 
CoreML  library [17]. This library is much more efficient, as it was specifically designed by 
Apple to take full advantage of the ARM architecture found in all Apple smartphones. This 
approach works by holding raw samples in a circular buffer and executing the spectrogram-
generation and classification function on the buffer four times per second. In order to create a 
spectrogram, we first performed a Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) on the raw audio samples. From 
there, we normalize, filter, and crop the results to remove the mirrored data produced by the FFT. 
Finally, we can use Apple’s UIKit to draw the spectrogram pixel by pixel. To visually represent 
amplitude, we simply mapped the amplitude to “hue” in the HSV color representation scheme, 
keeping saturation (S) and value (V) fixed at 100%. 
Perhaps one of the most beneficial aspects of this detection method is its ability to self-train 
using the magnetometer as a ground truth. During the training phase, the phone is mounted on 
the door while the magnetometer provides a reliable way to distinguish noise events from door 
events. When SecureHouse is first deployed, the user only needs to mount the device on the door 
for a short time during which the neural network is trained. Afterwards, she is free to move the 
smartphone into a more central and less obtrusive location or continue training with more and/or 
different doors.
  19 
IV. IMPLEMENTATION 
To demonstrate the effectiveness of our solution, we implemented SecureHouse as a 
prototype system. The following section describes some of the details and choices we made in 
the implementation phase. 
A. Phone Software 
Our detection system was written in Swift 2.3, compiled and tested using Xcode 7, and 
finally deployed on an iPhone 6 and 6S. We implemented our KNN+DTW algorithm from 
scratch, while our neural network was based on Collin Hundley’s Swift AI library [16]. Because 
of the inefficacies of Swift AI, we were forced to use Apple’s CoreML library when dealing with 
microphone data. In order to capture acceleration and magnetic field data programmatically, we 
used a low-level framework called Core Motion [18]. This library allows us to read the phone’s 
acceleration and magnetic field data at a rate up to 100Hz. In order to conserve battery life and 
processing power, we chose to set 30Hz as the reading frequency. To capture sound, we used 
Apple’s AVKit. This allowed us to capture and store individual audio frames from which we 
generated a spectrogram. 
B. Smartphone Case 
Additive manufacturing enables us to fabricate a smartphone mount specifically to suit 
our needs. Figure 12 shows a computer-generated model of the phone mount in its design phase 
and an image of the actual mount in use near a door. The case features a large back plate and 
screw holes so that it can be mounted on a wall near a door. The case’s large flat back plate 
serves two purposes. The first being an easy way to attach the plate to the wall via the four screw 
holes. Second, and more importantly, because of its hardness and multiple contact points over a 
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large surface area, it is able to mitigate vibrational dampening that may happen as vibrations 
transfer from the wall to the phone. 
 
 
Though the mount is designed to be a permanent installation, the phone itself can be slid 
in and out of the mount with relative ease in the event of replacement, physical service, or 
reprogramming. We do not consider the ability to remove the phone from its mount a deficiency 
in its security system duties, as an attacker would need to already be inside the home to remove 
the phone from its mount. 
C. Notifying the Homeowner 
For simplicity and to allow a rapid development of this prototype system, our 
implementation of texting and calling uses Twilio [19], a third-party service that allows us to 
send texts and make phone calls by simply making an HTTP request. We also used an open 
source library called “nodemailer” that allows a Node.js server app to easily send emails. Figure 
13 shows examples of alerts received by a homeowner in the form of a text message, an email, 
and a phone call.  
Fig.12: Smartphone Wall Mount 
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Home automation is a growing market; many homeowners have automated lights, 
cameras, door locks, etc. Because of the rapidly growing nature of the industry, we provide a 
way to interface with many third-party systems that a user may have by providing user-
configurable web-hooks. Web-hooks allow the user to specify a URL that an HTTP request 
should be made to upon door event detection. This allows SecureHouse to be easily and 
seamlessly integrated into many types of existing services. Possible integrations could include 
anything from turning on the homeowner’s lights to playing loud music to deter intruders. If a 
service has a RESTful API, SecureHouse can interact and integrate with it. This functionality 
makes our system incredibly flexible and versatile, as there may be several unthought-of use-
cases that could make SecureHouse even more effective. 
Fig.13: Example Notifications 
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V. EVALUATION 
A. Experimental Methodology 
The accelerometer-based experiments were conducted by mounting a smartphone on 
lightly textured drywall approximately 9 inches away from the latching mechanism of an exterior 
door. During the magnetometer experiment, the phone was mounted on the door itself near the 
hinge so that the phone would rotate when the door was opened or closed. For sound-based 
experiments, the phone was placed in a central location within direct line-of-sight of two exterior 
doors. The experiments were conducted in a 3-bedroom residential home approximately 20 feet 
away from the nearest road. Three types of vibrational noise scenarios were accounted for: 
ambient noise, walking noise, and automobile noise. Ambient noise was considered dead silence 
i.e. no external movement of any sort was present during the test. Automobile noise was 
generated by an automobile driving up and down the road closest to the house. Walking noise 
included normal to heavy footfall of people in the house during the trials. For acoustic noise, we 
considered loud footfall, talking, and automobile noise. Additionally, different speeds of door 
openings were accounted for. We considered three different types of door open speeds: slow, 
normal, and fast. We used a video camera and stopwatch to record and measure how long it took 
for a door to clear the door jamb at different opening speeds. Slow door events were classified as 
any door event in which the door took more than 0.6 seconds to clear door jamb. Normal events 
took between 0.3 and 0.6 seconds. Fast door open events consisted of any door events in which 
the door took less than 0.3 seconds to clear. 
B. Detection Accuracy 
Figures 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, and 19 show the detection rates for several series of door 
openings under various conditions using various detection methods. Detection rate is defined as 
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the number of detected door openings divided by the total number of door openings. Here each 
result is the average of 50 independent tests. For the FFNN method, we ran tests with two 
different assurance values, one at 60% and one at 75%. For the microphone method, we trained 
the model organically for three weeks (i.e. the phone was mounted on the door for three weeks 
during the training phase). Figure 20 shows the overall detection rate for all tests.  
 
 
 
 
          
 
Fig.14: Vibration-based, 
Naïve Method 
Fig.15: Vibration-based, 
FFNN, 60% Assurance 
Fig.16: Vibration-based, 
FFNN, 75% Assurance 
Fig.17: Vibration-based,  
KNN + DTW 
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Among the tested algorithms, the naive threshold-based detection using accelerometer 
data performs the worst, especially when the door is opened slowly. Its overall detection rate is 
61%. The high failure rate of this system is due to our derived threshold values. Though a wider 
threshold would produce a higher detection rate, the increase in sensitivity would severely hinder 
its ability to filter false positives. The magnetometer-based detection performs the best with a 
detection rate of 100%, which is consistent with intuition since rotation of the door is significant 
when a person enters the house. The FFNN method (when assurance is set as 60%) and the 
KNN+DTW method also have a very high detection rate of 98%. The two machine learning 
methods perform similarly when the door is opened fast and when the door is opened at normal 
Fig. 20: Overall Detection Rate 
Fig.18: Magnetometer-
based, 2uT Threshold 
Fig.19: Spectrogram-based, 3-
Week Training time. 
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speed. The performance is a little lower when the door is slowly opened. For them, the different 
types of noise do not have much impact on detection rate when the door is normally or quickly 
opened, but have a little effect when the door is slowly opened.  
For audio spectrogram-based detection, we see good performance under ideal 
circumstances. We notice that walking noise affects the detection accuracy more than automobile 
noise. This is expected, as walking produces more impulse-like sounds compared to the 
continuous “humming” sounds of nearby vehicles. Figure 21 shows an example of what a door 
opening looks like when a car drives by. We can see that automobile noise is mostly filtered until 
the door opens. Figure 22 shows an example of footfall in the home while a door opens. The 
sharp “spikes” are footsteps while the large colorful area in the center is the door opening.  
   
. 
 
Table I shows the results of false detections caused by knocking on the door. For this test, 
we considered two intensities of a knock - light and heavy, and the number of knocks which 
occurred - 1 or 2+. It can be seen that the magnetometer has complete immunity to noise, while 
Fig. 21: Spectrogram of Door Opening 
While Car Passes 
Fig. 22: Spectrogram of Door Opening 
with Footfall in Background 
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KNN+DTW is only moderately affected by heavy door knocks. A single heavy door knock is the 
more likely to produce a false positive than other knocks. 
 
TABLE I: False Positives Caused by Knocking on Door 
 FFNN 
Light 
Knock 
FFNN 
Heavy 
Knock 
KNN+DTW 
Light 
Knock 
KNN+DTW 
Heavy Knock 
Magnetometer 
Light Knock 
Magnetometer 
Heavy Knock 
Spectrogram 
Light Knock 
Spectrogram 
Heavy 
Knock 
1 Knock 1/20 8/20 0/20 4/20 0/20 0/20 0/20 0/20 
2+ Knocks 0/20 5/20 0/20 1/20 0/20 0/20 0/20 0/20 
 
C. Field Tests 
In addition to the 2,700 door openings performed above, we also let the system operate in 
a residential 3-bedroom home for short-term period 24 hours and a long-term period of 7 days. 
We conducted the 24-hour long test first to quickly determine which methods are most effective 
in a real-life scenario. We then used the top performing vibration-based detection method in our 
week-long experiment. We define false positives (FP) in these tests as any event that the device 
interprets as a door opening which was not a door opening. Table II shows the number of false 
positives during the 24-hour long test. Table III shows the results for the 7-day long test. We 
took note of whether a false positive was generated while no one was home versus while the 
home was occupied by the homeowner with the help of a video camera. Though we saw many 
false positives using vibrational-based detection under our machine learning-based detection 
methods, all of them occurred while the homeowner was awake at home. We found that our 3- 
bedroom house generated a large amount of highly varied environmental noise such as playing 
aggressively with dogs, loudly stomping about, and large groups of excited people during 
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televised sporting events. Since the alarm function can be disabled during these times, those false 
positives will not cause false warnings to be dispatched to the homeowner. 
 
TABLE II: Field Tests over 24 Hours 
Detection 
Algorithm 
FP- Homeowner is 
Away 
FP- Homeowner is 
Home 
False Alerts- 
Home- owner is 
Away 
False Alerts- 
Home- owner is 
Home 
Vibrations-
Threshold 2 22 2 0 
Vibratoins-FFNN-
75% Assurance 0 9 0 0 
Vibratoins-FFNN-
60% Assurance 0 21 0 0 
Vibrations-
KNN+DTW 0 19 0 0 
Magnetometer 2µT 0 0 0 0 
Audio 
Spectrogram 0 18 0 0 
 
TABLE III: Field Tests over 7 Days 
Detection Algorithm FP- Homeowner is Away 
FP- Homeowner is 
Home Unnecessary Warnings 
Vibrations- FFNN 75% 
Assurance 0 53 0 
 
D. Modeling Vibration Dissipation 
In order to determine the generality of vibration-based detection, we want to estimate a 
maximum distance away from a door that a smartphone could be mounted and still be effective. 
Specifically, we are interested in finding a distance such that Vi door open(x, y, z)  ≤ Vi noise(x, y, z). 
After this distance, the vibration caused by door open is too small to be differentiated from 
background noise. 
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To answer this question, we need to figure out how fast vibration dissipates in the wall. It 
is generally known in physics that the rate of energy dissipation from a single point in space can 
be modeled by: f(k) = αe−λx [20]. Our goal is to determine a suitable value for λ and α such that 
we may generalize how fast vibrations dissipate through the walls in a home. To do this, we 
purchased several high-sensitivity accelerometers [21] and mounted them at 1 foot intervals on a 
wall next to an exterior door. Figure 24 is a picture of the experimental setup. To generate a 
consistent source of vibration, we attached a rubber ball to a string of fixed length, and used it as 
a pendulum to strike the wall. Figure 23 shows the average result of 10 tests and a best-fit line 
from which we get the α and λ. Using this dampening rate (determined by λ) and our 
measurement of vibration strength near the door for door open, we can generate a theoretical 
vibration curve for several distances away from the door. We found that after distances become 
greater than 6ft, the magnitude of door-related vibration was less than or equal to that of ambient 
noise. We acknowledge that the dissipation rate might be different for different walls, but the 
result here can still shed some light on the effective distance of vibration-based detection. 
 
 
 
Fig. 23: Model of Vibration Dissipation in 
Drywall 
Fig. 24: Experimental Setup for Modeling 
Vibration Dissipation 
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E. Door Proximity & Interference 
In modern living spaces such as apartments and duplexes, exterior doors might be placed 
in close proximity to each other. We set out to determine if doors in close proximity would have 
any noticeable effect on our detection methods. We started out by visiting a local apartment 
building and taking some measurements. We measured 24’ 9” as the horizontal distance between 
doors, and 7’ 6” as the vertical distance between doors. With the smartphone mounted on the 
wall near a door, we opened and closed next-door neighbors’ doors several times and recorded 
the vibration intensity. We did this experiment for neighbor doors on the same floor, and the 
floors above and below. We observed that neighbors’ doors had virtually no impact on the 
vibration readings. This was expected, though, as our dampening model had predicted distances 
greater than six feet would be enough to reduce the magnitude of vibrations to that of 
environmental noise. 
F. Detecting Other Motion Events 
Although the detection rate of vibration-based and audio-based detection is a little lower 
than the magnetometer-based detection, they have one distinct advantage: they can detect other 
motion events in addition to door open. To demonstrate this, we conducted tests for window 
openings. For the accelerometer test, the window is 42 inches away from the wall-mounted 
smartphone. For the microphone test, the window is about eight feet away and in direct line-of-
sight. For these tests, we trained the two types of neural networks using 15 samples of window 
openings and 15 samples of noise (8 samples of ambient noise, and 7 samples of heavy footfall). 
The assurance parameter was set to 60% and the same 1-second sliding window described above 
was used. This implementation was nearly identical to how we detected door open events using 
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the neural networks. We tested 25 window openings. The detection results are shown in Table 
IV. 92% of the window openings can be detected. 
TABLE IV: Window Opening Detection 
Detection Algorithm Detection Rate 
FFNN – 60% Assurance 23/25 
Audio Spectrogram 20/25 
 
We see that the microphone-based method performs a little worse than the accelerometer-
based method. Though the results are slightly less accurate, the microphone is capable of 
detecting window openings for multiple windows whereas the accelerometer is limited to just 
doors and windows within six feet of the phone.   
G. Cost Evaluation 
In this section, we will describe how we evaluated the cost of our system as well as the 
results compared to a few other popular smartphone applications. 
1. Processing Time 
  For feedforward neural network, the algorithm is able to analyze a curve in 
0.0011 seconds. Since we are polling this algorithm at 30Hz (0.033 seconds), our program 
spends only 3% of its runtime analyzing curves, and the remaining 97% is spent idle. The 
KNN+DTW approach needs a much higher processing time. Each analyzation takes 0.76 
seconds. This is because the DTW algorithm has high time-complexity (O(n2)), the method does 
not have a training phase, and it uses 30 curves. 
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2. Memory Usage 
  The total size of our packaged detection app is around 20MB. This is on par with 
or lower than many apps in the App Store. Our app does not write any data to disk during 
operation, so we can expect this value to remain constant during the life of the operation. For 
memory consumption, our analysis shows that the FFNN detection algorithm uses 5.8MB of 
memory on average, while the KNN+DTW detection algorithm uses 5.5MB on average. Our 
sliding window contains 90 doubles, which iOS allocates 8 bytes [22] each to. Our sliding 
window releases unused values, so we say the extra cost of the sliding window is less than 1KB. 
3. Network Usage 
  The SecureHouse detection app only uses the network when a door event is 
detected. Upon door event detection, a POST request is made to the threat response server which 
contains only an 128-bit access token and two integers representing the type of event and the 
homeowner’s notification preferences. The total size of this request is less than 350 bytes. This 
results in around 15KB of data being sent per day when the home is in use, and near 0KB of data 
being sent when the homeowner is away. 
4. Power Consumption 
  iOS does not support gathering of energy consumption in units of mW, so we 
used Xcode’s Instrument Panel to monitor energy consumption. This tool allows us to see an 
“energy usage level” on a scale of 0-20. For the FFNN, KNN+DTW, and Magnetometer 
detection methods, our app achieves a rating of 0 (best) for energy consumption. Furthermore, 
the energy-consumption tool shows that the detection methods use between 6% and 15% of the 
CPU cycles. We found that this is much lower than other types of apps. In particular, Crossy 
Road, a popular mobile game scores a 3/20 and uses between 39% and 58% of the CPU cycles. 
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While Chrome, a web browser for iOS, scores a little better with a rating of 0/20 but uses an 
average of 21% of the CPU cycles. In order to get a better feel for the power consumption of our 
detection app, we ran experiments and found that it takes more than 80 minutes to deplete an 
iPhone 6’s battery by 10% while running any of the detection algorithms. This means that, 
though the phone would need a permanent power source, the system could remain operational 
for more than 13 hours in the event of a power loss. 
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VI. CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORK 
This paper studied the feasibility of using the accelerometer, magnetometer, and 
microphone of a smartphone to detect door openings and build a home security system. We 
developed two machine learning based detection methods using the accelerometer data, one 
detection method using magnetometer data, one detection method using the microphone, and 
developed a prototype system. Experiments showed that door openings can be accurately 
detected using accelerometer and magnetometer data, with a detection rate of 98% and higher. 
The microphone can detect door openings across multiple doors with an accuracy of 90%. 
Accelerometer and sound-based detection can also detect window openings with high accuracy. 
Smartphones containing built-in Wi-Fi connectivity are easily capable of dispatching alerts to the 
homeowner or even law enforcement. Thus, our smartphone-based home security system built 
with retired smartphones could be a viable and economical option for residential homes.  
As for future work, our system could be expanded upon in several ways. First, as it stands 
currently, if a user wishes to use the accelerometer, she must manually train the model by 
opening the door several times for each door. Compared to the magnetometer and microphone-
based approaches, this is a bit clunky. Perhaps we could gather enough data on many doors to 
create a generalized prediction model so that a potential user can skip this training process. 
Though the microphone-based detection method uses the magnetometer to train itself, three 
weeks is quite a long time for the device to spend in training mode. Again, we could potentially 
create a generalized model for this such that it can classify most door openings without extra 
training from the user. Second, since vibrations caused by door opening dissipate quickly and 
become indistinguishable from environmental noise after 6 feet, most likely a smartphone 
mounted near one exterior door can only detect the openings of this door when relying on 
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vibrational data. There are many apartments and small duplexes that only have one exterior door 
or doors near each other. For a large house with multiple exterior doors, using one smartphone 
for each door, although not totally infeasible (e.g., when there are multiple residents with 
multiple retired phones), seems too costly. In this scenario, we recommend using the audio-based 
detection method, as it can detect several doors while in a central location. In our future work, 
we will investigate a way to improve the audio-based detection method. 
Finally, we could further augment SecureHosue to incorporate even more sensors and 
detection methods. This could include the use of more passive detection methods like Bluetooth 
and Wi-Fi scanning or even using the barometer in conjunction with the other detection methods. 
Ideally, we want to create a system which can use a single device to detect, report, and deter 
break-ins regardless of any environmental variables.
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